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Lazerow: Real Property

Real Property
by Herbert I. Lazerow*
Abandonment and Adverse Possession

During the year, the California courts made the acquisition
of property, either by adverse possession or possession as a
result of the owner's abandonment, more difficult. While
the courts did not change the rules of law they insisted on
their pristine application. This demonstrates an understandable tendency, in an urbanizing society, toward restricting the
transfer of title by possession alone to non-owners.
Adverse Possession

In Schoenfelt v. Pritzker/ plaintiff sought to quiet title to
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six acres which defendants, the neighboring landowners,
had cultivated in annual crops for twenty years. Although
defendants had not paid taxes on the property, as required
for adverse possession by California Code of Civil Procedure,
section 325, they contended that the action was barred by
section 318 of that code, which provides that no action for recovery of real property can be maintained unless plaintiff
was seized or possessed of the property within five years of
bringing suit. Plaintiff had not been in possession for the past
twenty years, but the court held that the phrase "seized or
possessed" included the seisin of a titleholder not in actual
possession of the property. This construction integrates the
two sections and provides that title may not be acquired by
adverse possession unless, in addition to the other requirements,2 the possessor has paid all taxes on the property. This
would seem to conform to the legislative intent of the sections.
The court took a strict position in Gerhard v. Stephens. 3
Plaintiffs, the owners of mineral rights, sued to quiet title
to the mineral interests. Defendants were the owners of the
surface, who had used it fully for longer than the period required for adverse possession. Since the mineral rights were
not separately assessed, defendants had paid taxes for the
statutory period. Defendants had also given mineral leases
for their entire tract, which included the land on which the
plaintiffs had drilling rights. All drilling, however, occurred
outside plaintiffs' interest. The court held that possession
of the surface did not include adverse possession of the
mineral rights when such rights had been severed from the
surface by deed. Nor does assertion of dominion over the
mineral rights by giving a lease constitute adverse possession.
Since no one drilled for minerals on plaintiffs' mineral lands,
the plaintiffs had no cause of action for ejectment.
Defendants also invoked the doctrine of constructive adverse possession which provides that where a person is in
adverse possession under color of title, the possession is
deemed to apply to the entire tract described in his document

2. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§ 322325.
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3. 68 Cal.2d 864, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612,
442 P.2d 692 (1968).
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court
properly rejected this contention, forcefully making the point that for the doctrine of constructive adverse possession to apply, there must be some actual adverse
possession on which an action of ejectment could rest. None
existed in this case.
A case that took a view favorable to the acquisition of
title by adverse possession was Lawrence v. Maloof.4 Plaintiff
purchased property at an execution sale in 1955, but the marshal's deed was not delivered until 1964. Plaintiff then
brought an action to quiet title against adverse possessors
on the land who had paid the taxes throughout the entire
period. The court held that plaintiff's cause of action accrued
when he made the purchase at the execution sale since he had
the right to eject anyone on the property at that time. He had
absolute title, subject only to the former owner's right of redemption. Since the court held the date of delivery of the
deed irrelevant, defendants acquired title by adverse possession.

Abandonment

In Gerhard, the court, after discussing adverse possession,
went on to discuss the doctrine of abandonment. The defendants, in addition to their arguments for adverse possession,
contended that plaintiffs had abandoned their interests in the
mineral rights.
The court first held that an interest in oil and gas, being a
profit a prendre, is closest to an easement in its characteristics
and should be equally subject to abandonment. The fee
simple interest in real property may not be abandoned because the property would be left without a titleholder. When
a mineral lease or easement is abandoned, however, the
interest reverts to the owner of the fee. This permits the
clearing of title to mineral land, particularly when the interest
is held by unknown parties. The court reaffirmed this traditional doctrine of abandonment, then proceeded to hold that
4. 256 Cal. App.2d 600, 64 Cal. Rptr.
233 (1967).
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one of the prerequisites, intention to abandon, was not fulfilled by one group of plaintiffs.
The comparison between the two groups is instructive.
Neither group made any use of the mineral rights during
the half century that elapsed between their acquisition and
the subsequent drilling under lease from defendants. The
following acts of one group of plaintiffs were held insufficient
as a matter of law to support a finding of intent to abandon:
Failure to include their interest in the estates of deceased
owners; failure to enter the land or attempt to search for
oil or lease to others the right to search; failure to have their
mineral rights separately assessed by the county for tax purposes; and failure to seek their share of the proceeds of oil
leases given by the surface owners. The court buttressed its
judgment by pointing out that these plaintiffs were but several
of 148 different owners, many of whom could not be located.
To begin drilling would have put the expense and risk on these
owners completely. If they had succeeded, they would have
had to share the proceeds with all of the other owners. In
light of these economic realities, the omissions noted above
by themselves were not sufficent evidence of intent to abandon.
It is unclear whether the economic exigencies were the crucial
factors, or whether the case stands for the proposition that
non-use is never sufficient to establish intent to abandon, thus
overruling to that extent cases such as Payne v. Neuval. 5 It
does overrule Romero v. Brewer,6 which found abandonment
of an oil lease as a result of inadequate machinery for drilling,
failure to obtain a permit from the state, and failure to erect
a derrick. These would seem to be simply non-use and, if
anything, would indicate an intention to drill which was
carried out in an inefficient manner. 7
The other group of plaintiffs was held to have abandoned
their interests when they refused to accept distribution of
them from the executor of their predecessor's estate as being
worthless. The specific rejection, added to half a century of

5. 155 Cal. 46, 99 P. 476 (1908).
6. 58 Cal. App.2d 759, 137 P.2d 872
(1943).
4'68
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renouncing group was fortunate in not knowing of their interest; they had no opportunity to renounce and so prevailed.
In the course of the discussion of abandonment, the court
pointed out that a conscientious owner of a mineral interest
can always avoid abandonment by requesting that a separate
tax assessment be assigned for the mineral interests. s Continuous payment of taxes negates any presumption of intent
to abandon that might be raised by other statements or
activities.

Vendor and Purchaser

Consumer Protection

Traditionally, the consumer in a real estate transaction
had no protection against the seller. No warranties were
implied for real estate sales or construction. 9 Any express
warranties that existed in the contract were extinguished by
merger into the deed. 1o
The latter rule has been specifically relaxed in some jurisdictions,ll and impliedly relaxed in California. 12 There has
also been a tendency to expand the definition of fraud in realty
sales in order to avoid the harshness of caveat emptor. 13 Two
cases decided this year confirmed the growing trend toward
8. Rev. and Tax. Code § 2803. Another case strictly confining the doctrine
of abandonment with regard to easements by grant is Faus v. City of Los
Angeles, 67 Ca1.2d 350, 62 Cal. Rptr.
193, 431 P.2d 849 (1967).
9. Williston, Contracts § 926 (1963);
Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of
Realty-Recent Assaults upon the Rule,
14 Vand. L. Rev. 541 (1961).
10. Williston, Contracts (1963) §§
926, 926(a).
11. Weck v. A:M Sunrise Construction Co., 36 Ill. App.2d 383, 184
N.E.2d 728 (1962). (Merger depends
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on intention of the parties; no merger
found. The Weck case also found an
implied warranty in the contract. This
holding was later overruled in Coutrakon v. Adams, 39 Ill. App.2d 290, 188
N.E.2d 780 (1963), affirmed on other
grounds, 31 Ill.2d 189, 201 N.E.2d
100.
12. Greenberg v. Hastie, 202 Cal.
App.2d 159, 20 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1962).
Cf. Pollyanna Homes, Inc. v. Berney,
56 Cal.2d 676, 16 Cal. Rptr. 345, 365
P.2d 401 (1961).
13. Buist v. C. Dudley De Velbiss
Corp. 182 Cal. App.2d 325, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 259 (1960).
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more consumer protection. One case presages the imposition
of implied warranties in real estate contracts.
In Sweeney v. Stone,14 defendant purchased subdivision lots
and hired a contractor to construct a house on one of them.
Though unstable soil is common in the area, no soil tests were
made. Plaintiff purchased the completed house from defendant. Much of the lot eroded during the ensuing rainy season.
Plaintiff recovered damages for negligence from defendant,
on the theory that defendant and his contractor had a duty
to plaintiff to construct the home is a non-negligent manner.
The court ignored the fact that the house was built by defendant for sale, which might have been a significant distinction. 1s Failure to draw the distinction was proper in this
case, where the house would be sold to some person, although
his exact identity was unknown. The decision solidifies a
line of cases dating from 1963 permitting a buyer of a house
to hold the builder liable for damage to the house caused by
negligence in its construction,16 and extends it to damage done
to the land by such negligence.
Coons v. Gunn 17 is a fragmentary opinion that breaks startling new ground in the field of real property sales. Plaintiff's
assignor agreed to sell undeveloped property to defendant
buyers for $80,000. As a result of soil tests, buyers refused
to proceed with the contract unless the price was reduced to
$70,000. An appropriate amendment was made to the escrow
instructions. Then buyers discovered that there were no
sewer connections to the property, septic tanks were forbidden,
and substantial off-site improvements would be needed to
connect to the nearest sewer line. They refused to proceed
with the contract. Plaintiff sued for damages. The appellate
court held that from the circumstances surrounding the sale,

14. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. 497 (1968).
15. See Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d
857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 345
(1961) (landowner recovered damages
for negligence of contractor in installing swimming pool in land already
owned).
470
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16. Sabella v. Wisler, 59 Cal.2d 21,
27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963);
Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App.2d 183,
65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968).
17. 263 Cal. App.2d 594, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 876 (1968).
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there was an implied condition that the lots were usable as residentiallots without substantial and expensive work. It also
reversed the trial court's finding that the property was usable
residential property, because the evidence was insufficient
for the finding. Thus, in the absence of waiver of the condition by the buyers, damages for their failure to perform
could not be recovered.
The implications of the case are enormous. Knowledge
that the buyers were seeking the property for residential use
was held sufficient to imply a condition of suitability. This
will protect buyers who, as in this case, refuse to complete the
contract.
But the case contains broader implications. If a condition of suitability can be implied, why not a covenant of
suitability? This is nothing more than a warranty of suitability, the breach of which will incur a suit for damages.
Such a warranty would be of substantial help to the vast
majority of buyers with complaints about real estate purchases. Most of them do not discover that the property is uninhabitable or unsuitable for the planned use until after the
deed is delivered; then the buyers try to use it. The buyer
needs a remedy that will permit him to keep the land and
recover whatever damages are required to make the land
suitable for his use.
The doctrine that the contract of sale is merged into the
deed, even if it contains implied warranties, should be no
obstacle to recovery, since the doctrine is being relaxed. If
the standard for merger is the intention of the parties, merger
should not be found where there is an implied warranty.
Warranties must survive the delivery of the deed to be effective, so the parties could not have intended to extinguish them
with the deed.
Even without an extension into warranties it will add
enormously to the remedies of innocent buyers. They will no
longer be obligated to prove fraud in order to avoid the contract. Proof that both parties knew that buyers had planned
to use the property for a residence and that it is unsuitable
for such use is sufficient. Presumably, the rule would apply
CAL LAW 1969
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to old housing as well as new, and provide a full defense to
a suit for damages or for the purchase price in a case where
the property did not meet the provisions of the Housing Code
in force at the time 18 or, with multi-unit rental property, where
the zoning ordinance did not permit the use contemplated by
the parties.
Strict Compliance with Sales Contract

In several cases this year, the courts have insisted on
strict compliance with the contract of sale before the parties
will be granted specific performance. Substantial performance
was deemed insufficient.
In Moss v. Minor Properties Inc./ 9 plaintiff seller and defendant buyer executed identical escrow instructions providing that if the conditions of the escrow were not completed
by March 1, 1965, they could be completed thereafter unless
a written demand was made by one of the parties to cease the
escrow. On the date appointed, the deed had been sent to the
title company but not recorded, and no title insurance had been
issued. On that day the buyer received approval of his loan,
but instructed the escrow holder in writing to terminate the
escrow. The court held that unless the terms of the escrow
were strictly complied with, specific performance should not
be granted. The fact that the purchaser deposited the purchase price with the escrow holder after learning that escrow
would not close on March 1, 1965, was held not to constitute
a waiver; he merely complied with his covenant.
In Andover Land Co. v. Hofjman,20, 1 the court found strict
compliance with the escrow instructions. These instructions
set a closing date on the escrow. It was provided that a party
who had fully complied could thereafter demand termination
of the escrow, but that no termination would be permitted
until five days after notice of the demand had been given to the
other party. Since the defaulting party had cured his default
18. See e.g., Brown v. Southall ReaIty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App.
[1968]); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d
590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
472
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within five days, the demand was insufficient to terminate the
escrow.
Escrows

The courts discussed the liability of escrow holders in
several cases. In Lee v. Title Insurance & Trust CO.,2 plaintiff
sued defendant escrow holder for failure to notify plaintiffs
that sellers were defrauding them, since the $135,000 trust
deed they were receiving secured only a $100,000 note. The
court exonerated the escrow holder because it had faithfully
executed its instructions. The rationale was that the escrow
agency is limited and liability would subject the escrow
holder to a high litigation risk. In every case where a real
estate transaction fails, the injured party would sue the escrowee for failure to disclose. While this argument is not
overly persuasive, it is difficult to place an absolute obligation
on the escrow holder to reveal anything of which he has knowledge or notice. He is not a trustee for the parties, only an
agent for limited purposes. Plaintiff argued that where the
purposes were such that they gave the escrow holder a unique
opportunity to discover the facts, he should have had an obligation to disclose them. The court correctly refused to accept
this argument.
Consistent with the Lee holding, Kish v. Bay Counties Title
Guarantee Co. 3 held an escrow holder liable for consequential
damages when he failed to follow instructions. A qualification, however, was placed on this liability. Where the conditions in the escrow could not have benefited the injured
party, the escrow holder was not liable to him. Plaintiff
sued the escrow holder for all damages resulting from a
disastrous real property deal wherein he exchanged his house
and a substantial note for Nevada commercial property. The
escrow holder neglected to have plaintiff sign the trust deed
on the Nevada property called for in escrow agreement. The
escrow holder was held not liable for the damages resulting
from completion of the transaction. He was, however, held
2. 264 Cal. App.2d - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. 378 (1968).

3. 254 Cal. App.2d 725, 62 Cal. Rptr.
494 (1967).
CAL LAW 1969
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liable in the amount of any deficiency judgment recovered
by the note holder against plaintiff. 4
Akin v. Business Title Corp.5 nullified exculpatory clauses
in escrow contracts. The escrow company placed an exculpatory clause in its contract relieving itself from liability for
ordinary negligence. It erroneously recorded a trust deed in
Los Angeles County instead of in Orange County where the
land was located. The buyer went bankrupt and seller was
left without a remedy. Overruling Simmons v. Bank of
America,6 the court held the exculpatory clause invalid. On
the authority of Tunkl v. Regents oj the University oj Calijornia,7 the court found the clause to be against the public
interest if: (1) it involved a transaction which concerned a
business of a type suitable for public regulation; (2) the
party insisting on the exculpatory clause had a decisive advantage of bargaining strength because of the importance of
the service to the public; and (3) no provisions were available
for additional protection against negligence. Recognizng that
the inherent inequality of the escrow situation requires a limit
on contractual provisions, the court extended its view of what
transactions constitute contracts of adhesion. 8 It is likely
that this rule will be applied to other contracts of adhesion,
such as leases in a tight rental market. 9

Security Problems

This year, as last, the striking thing about property litigation is the number of cases in the field of real estate financing.
4. See text infra at note 12.
5. 264 Cal. App. 2d - , 70 Cal.
Rptr. 287 (1968).
6. 159 Cal. App.2d 566, 323 P.2d
1043 (1958).
7. 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383
P.2d 441, 6 A.L.R.3d 693 (1963).
8. See Reith, Contractual Exculpation from Tort Liability in California-
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The "True Rule" Steps Forward, 52
Cal. L. R. 350 (1964); Grisinger v.
Golden State Bank, 92 Cal. App. 443,
268 P. 425 (1928). For a view of the
policy as applied to landlord-tenant
law, see Kay v. Cain, 154 F.2d 305, 81
App. D.C. 24 (1946).
9. But see contra, Barkett v. Brucato,
122 Cal. App.2d 264, 264 P.2d 978
(1953).
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Deficiency

California Code of Civil Procedure section 580b prohibits
a deficiency judgment where a purchase money security interest is insufficient to cover the debt. This provision received
conflicting treatment in three cases this year.
In Paramount Savings & Loan Association v. Barber/o defendant purchased property subject to a construction loan and
executed an assumption agreement on the obligation. Although defendant contended that he qualified under section
580b because he assumed the note as a purchase money obligation, the court held that the obligation must be characterized
at the time it is initially issued, and at that time it had been
a construction loan, not a purchase money loan. Therefore,
the loan did not fall within section 580b and defendant cO!lld
be subjected to a deficiency judgment.
Defendant in this case was within the class sought to be
protected by the anti-deficiency statute. He was a purchase
money borrower. The only argument that can be made in
opposition is that the lender has his rights impaired without
consent if his obligation is changed from non-purchase money
to purchase money after he issues it. But there is no loss in
rights, as the lender can still recover from the original trustor
on a personal judgment if the security is insufficient to satisfy
the debt. The original trustor is not a purchase money debtor.
Where the creditor has no control over the assumption, the
assignee-debtor should nevertheless be protected by the antideficiency legislation.
The opinion fails to mention whether the loan agreement
permitted the lender to call the loan when the property was
sold (a common provision in trust deeds). If so, failure to
call the loan puts the lender in the same position as though
he had called the loan and then re-lent the money to the purchaser. In that case, the lender would be a purchase money
lender, and a substance-over-form argument would dictate
the same result in the case at bar.11 The specific revision of
10. 263 Cal. App.2d 166, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 390 (1968).
11. Riesenseld, Calif. Legis/ation
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direction.
In two choice-of-Iaw cases, however, the court read section
580b expansively. In Kish v. Bay Counties Title Guarantee
CO.,12 an intervening homeowner sued the escrow-holder for
failure to follow the escrow instructions by not preparing and
executing a proper trust deed for the homeowner to sign. That
would have protected him from a deficiency judgment. The
intervener and escrowee were both California residents and
the escrow was to be performed in California. The property
was situated in Nevada. The court held section 580b applicable despite the fact that the property in question was in another jurisdiction. Since the intervener would have been protected from a deficiency judgment had the trust deed been executed, he recovered damages.
The second choice-of-Iaw case, Younker v. Reseda Manor/ 3
concerned a deed of trust executed by a California corporation
and a California resident in Nevada on Nevada land. The
court rejected the argument that questions relating to real
property are decided by the law of the situs on the reasonable
ground that the question did not involve the real property, but
rather concerned a personal judgment against the owner. In
going on to balance the contacts, the court found a strong
California policy in preserving the solvency of its residents
and held that the statute extended to this transaction. It also
distinguished Bernkrant v. Fowler,14 a leading choice-of-Iaw
case, on rather dubious grounds. A more realistic distinction
would contrast California's strong policy against deficiency
judgments with the weaker policy of the statute of frauds
involved in Bernkrant.
Taken together, these cases presage a wide geographical
scope for the protection of the California anti-deficiency
statute. Since the predominant contact identified seems to be
the residence of the debtor, and such actions usually must be
New Judicial Approach, 51 Cal. L. R. 1
(1963).
12. 254 Cal. App.2d 725, 62 Cal.
Rptr. 494 (1967).
476
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brought at his place of residence, effective protection can be
given Californians from deficiency judgments.
Union Bank v. Gradski 5 also emphasized strong protection
against deficiency judgments. Although the case involved the
question of whether a creditor, who elected to sell property
at a non-judicial sale could recover the deficiency from the
guarantor, the court discussed the California Code of Civil
Procedure section 580d. This section provides that deficiency
judgments can be recovered only where the debtor has a right
to redeem, that is, in a judicial foreclosure. Though only
dictum, its force and persuasiveness carry much weight. The
court decided that section 580d would apply to bar a guarantor's recovery in a suit by a guarantor who paid the debt,
subrogated to the creditor's rights against the debtor. The
guarantor's rights derived from the creditor's and since the
creditor could not have recovered a deficiency, it should not
be possible to subject the debtor to a deficiency judgment by
adding an additional step to the process. The creditor could
either have judicially foreclosed, preserving his right and the
right of the guarantor to recover a deficiency from the debtor,
or he could have elected a non-judicial sale where he would
not have been entitled to a deficiency from the debtor. Since
he elected a non-judicial sale, the court held that the creditor
was estopped from recovering a deficiency from the guarantor.
The concept of estoppel was inappropriate here. This was an
application of the theory that any discharge of the debtor
discharges the surety.16
Deeds oj Trust
Gates v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank 17 involved a dragnet
clause in a trust deed. Co-tenants of real property gave a
trust deed to refinance the prior secured indebtedness of one
co-tenant. The deed provided that it would secure "the payment of all other monies and indebtedness now and hereafter
15. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal.
Rptr. 64 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see YORK, REMEDIES,
in this volume.

16. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 2810, 2819.
17. 257 Cal. App.2d 857, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 536 (1968).
CAL LAW 1969
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due or owing from trustor or any of them to the beneficiary."
Unknown to the other co-tenant, a prior unsecured note of
the first co-tenant to the beneficiary was in default. The court
held that the other co-tenant did not intend to include the
separate debt within the mortgage since he did not know of it.
The case reasonably restricts the ability of a security holder
to bring unintended debts within its ambit. This case of
first impression in California suggests that when a pre-existing
debt by one co-tenant is meant to be included, it must either
be specifically included in the instrument or the holder of the
security interest must establish that the non-debtor co-tenant
knew of the prior debt. In dictum, the court quoted First v.
Byrne 18 with approval in setting forth the general rule that
the property covered by the security interest is existing or
future joint indebtedness; existing or future individual indebtedness of the mortgagor whose interest is foreclosed; and
existing or future debts known or consented to by the person
foreclosed. Although the court was able to distinguish Langerman v. Puritan Dining Room CO.,19 which involved advances made subsequent to the mortgage, the spirit of the two
cases are directly opposed. Thus, security lenders would be
wise in the future to secure specific agreements in writing for
the inclusion of new loans in the mortgage. Relying on testimony of the behavior and speech of the trustor is uncertain,
and, without a court's finding that the party foreclosed consented to the inclusion of the subsequent debt within the
security interest, it will not be enforced.
Manning v. Queen 20 involved the impairment of a junior
security. Trustor sued the beneficiaries of a second trust to
enjoin foreclosure after default, contending that the payment
of the amount of the default and the delinquency fee cured
the default. 1 The beneficiaries contended that trustors were
still in default since trustors had defaulted on the first trust by
failing to pay taxes, insurance, and several fees, which the

18. 238 Iowa 712, 28 N.W.2d 509,
172 A.L.R. 1072 (1947).
19. 21 Cal. App. 637, 132 P. 617
(1913).
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beneficiary under the first trust advanced. This resulted in
an increase in the principal of the first trust of $890. The
second trust had required that these payments on the first
trust be made. The beneficiaries on the first trust had, in
fact, made the payments but had not been reimbursed by the
trustors. The court held the trustors in default, since a trustor
may not impair the security interest of his beneficiary. Here,
the increase in the amount of the prior trust impaired the
beneficiary's interest.
The case on its facts is easy, since the provision for the payment of taxes and insurance was incorporated in the second
trust deed and a failure to discharge these debts was both a
technical and substantial default. A more difficult case would
be presented where a specific provision was not included in the
second trust. There, it would be questionable whether the
beneficiary would be justified in considering this a default.
He could, of course, sue for his damages resulting from the
impairment of the security.2 The beneficiary's damages could
be measured either by the damage to the security or by the
extent to which the security is worth less than the debt. The
security cushion is one of the factors taken into consideration
in determining other aspects of the loan, such as term and interest. Therefore any diminution in the value of the security
should be recoverable3 whether it constitutes a default or not,
and the recovery applied against the debt.
Hill v. Gibralter Savings & Loan Association of Beverly
Hills 4 involved a trust deed sale for cash. The beneficiary of
the first trust deed bid the amount due on that trust. A
stranger raised the bid several hundred dollars. Plaintiff, the
beneficiary under the second trust, bid a higher amount but
was unable to show cash for that amount. His request for a
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 2929 provides
that no person whose interest is subject
to the lien of mortgage may do any act
which will substantially impair mortgagee's security. This provision requires determining what impairment is
substantial. In the case at bar, the first
trust was $15,900; the second trust, $2,-
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750. The impairment was $890. The
impairment of security to the extent of
30% of the debt secured is certainly
su bstantial.
318-319
3. Osborne, Mortgages,
(1951).
4. 254 Cal. App.2d 241, 62 Cal. Rptr.
188 (1967).
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delay to secure cash was denied. The court held this proper
because the outside buyer might have disappeared in the
interim, withdrawing his bid. In distinguishing dictum in a
prior case,5 the court leaned toward an opposite result if
the only parties bidding had been the holders of the first
and second trust deeds. There the beneficiary of the first
trust would have lost nothing by allowing the second beneficiary a reasonable period to go to the bank to secure cash.
In the instant case, however, the outside purchaser, who was
willing to pay cash, might have withdrawn his bid. The court
was willing to protect a junior lienholder only where it would
not injure a senior lienholder.

Concurrent Estates
Two California cases this year demonstrate the strong and
continuing hold of common-law doctrine and the continued
importance of form over substance in the field of real property
titles.
In Burke v. Stevens 6 one joint tenant conveyed her interest
to a straw man who then reconveyed it to her. None of the
deeds was recorded or returned to her but rather they were
placed in her attorney's file. Despite the fact that the other
joint tenant had no knowledge of the conveyance and no
innocent party's rights had intervened, the court held that the
secret conveyance was sufficient to terminate the joint tenancy.
In another case, Clark v. Carter,7 one joint tenant had conveyed property from herself as joint tenant to herself as tenant
in common and recorded the deed. The court adhered to the
common-law rule that every conveyance requires a grantor
and a grantee and that they must be different people. It was
argued that since California Civil Code section 683 permits
a transfer from an individual to that individual and another
as joint tenants, it should also permit the severance of joint
tenancy without the use of a straw man. The court, disagreed,
5. Kleckner v. Bank of America, 97
Cal. App.2d 30, 217 P.2d 28 (1950).
6. 264 Cal. App.2d 30, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 87 (1968).
480
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however, reading California Civil Code section 1039 to prohibit any transfer where only one party is involved. This is a
strained reading of section 1039, which simply defines the
word "transfer" as an act by which the title to property is
conveyed from one living person to another. It can be argued
that the conveyance from one person in a particular form to
himself in a different form is equivalent to the transfer from
one person to another. Furthermore, the section seems to be
a preliminary definition to a large number of sections interpreting "transfer,"8 and having nothing whatsoever to do with
the question at bar in this case.
Some footwork was needed to sustain the logical symmetry
of this area of law in Estate of Casella. 9 Here, one of the joint
tenants fraudulently induced his wife, the other joint tenant,
to deed her interest to him. He then conveyed the property
to a bona fide purchaser. The court held that the joint
tenancy was never severed; the deed from husband to wife
was fraudulent and therefore voidable. When the court set
the deed aside, it declared that it was as though it had never
existed. Faced then with the contention that the husband's
subsequent conveyance of the entire property terminated the
joint tenancy, the court again dodged. It held, confusingly
enough, that the husband did not intend to sever the joint
tenancy by making the conveyance, but rather intended to pass
full title. Under the rule that the sale of joint tenancy property impresses joint tenancy upon the proceeds, the court then
held that the proceeds were subject to the usual rules of
survivorship. 10 The analysis here is inadequate. The court
neglected to observe that the fraudulent, voidable deed from
wife to husband was never avoided. A bona fide purchaser
intervened, preventing the wife from recovering her interest
in the realty itself. It would have been better to consider
the realty impressed with a constructive trust in joint tenancy
because of the fraudulent procurement of the deed. When it
8. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1040-1085.
9. 256 Cal. App.2d 312, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 259 (1967).
10. The court's justification for this
IS interesting.
"To hold that by this
31
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sale the joint tenancy relationship as to
the purchase money was destroyed
would be to give Domenico a premium
on his fraud." 256 Cal. App.2d at 323,
64 Cal. Rptr. at 266.
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was sold, the proceeds would have been held in the same
fashion. But to say that there was no actual severance of
the unities here by either of the two conveyances is an unsatisfactory fiction.
The right to the use of property was litigated in Garibaldi
v. Garibaldi. ll The parties held several contiguous parcels of
timberland as tenants in common. Defendant cut timber from
one parcel which constituted more than his share of the value
of the timber on that property, but less than his share of the
total value of the timber. The court held that no action
would lie for recovery of an aliquot share of the profits because the property could be reasonably partitioned to satisfy
the parties' interests. While this case does not purport to be an
extension of the rule that business profits earned on the property need not be shared with non-risk taking co-tenants/ 2 it
seems contrary to several prior California cases13 which require
the co-tenant to account for net profits from mines, oil wells,
or lumbering. The case can, however, be reconciled on the
theory that it was combined with an action for partition and it
was as easy to partition, considering the ease of apportioning
the remaining timber value of the land, as it was to apportion
the profit and then partition the land into portions of current
value. It is not precedent for ,denial of an accounting where
there is no partition, or where partition is not possible in equitable fashion because one of the co-tenants took excessive
profits from the land.

Boundaries
Where the parties are uncertain as to the boundary between
their property, a boundary fixed by an oral agreement will
be valid if one of the parties relies thereon to his detriment. 14
The justification for this doctrine is that the uncertainty of

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/17

11. 264 Cal. App.2d 9, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 92 (1968).
12. Pico v. Columbet, 12 Cal. 414
(1859).

Cal. 134, 27 P. 863 (1883); Payne v.
Callahan, 37 Cal. App.2d 503, 99 P.2d
1050 (1940); Hihn v. Peck, 18 Cal. 640
(I 861).

13. See, for example, McCord v.
Oakland Quicksilver Mining Co., 64
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the boundary
and the acquiescence for such a period of time
as to found reliance is tantamount to a construction of the
deeds that will be binding on the parties. It is a way of avoiding the statutory prohibition on conveyance of interests in land
without a written document. It is also designed to secure
repose in boundary disputes.
In Roman v. Ries,15 defendants purchased land adjacent to
plaintiff's predecessor without knowing the exact boundary
line. Plaintiff's predecessor pointed out the boundary line but
was mistaken. In reliance thereon, defendant built his
house partly on plaintiff's predecessor's land. Plaintiff sued
to quiet title, contending that the agreed boundary had not
been maintained for the period of the statute of limitations.
The court held that the defendant had relied on the agreed
boundary to his detriment in constructing the house and 'that
he should not be deprived of it to his injury. The court went
on to hold that only that portion of plaintiff's land which
had reasonable relation to the construction would be transferred as a result of the boundary agreement. Against defendant's contention that the boundary agreement should either
be approved in full or disapproved, the court held that equity
could fashion whatever relief seemed appropriate. Here, the
boundary agreement was upheld only because the defendant
would have suffered damage otherwise. There was no reason
to give him more land than would be sufficient to counteract
that damage. The decision demonstrates that the court will
fashion a remedy as flexible as necessary to find a solution
without unjustly enriching the prevailing party. Presumably
the judgment will be recorded to put future purchasers on
notice of the odd boundary lines.

Easements and Licenses

In recent cases the courts have taken a liberal view of
the purposes behind easements and have found that a change
in use conforms to the original purpose. In Faus v. Los
Angeles,16 the original grantors had given an easement for
15. 259 Cal. App.2d 65, 66 Cal.
Rptr. 120 (1968).
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16. 67 Cal.2d 350, 62 Cal. Rptr. 193,
431 P.2d 849 (1967).
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an electric railway. After discontinuance of the railway, the
easement was used for a bus service. The court held that
the grantor's intent was to provide public transportation across
the land, and bus service was an adequate substitute. In
Norris v. State of California ex reI. Department of Public
Works,17 the court held that an easement granted for highway
and road purposes along a lake included the construction
of a roadside rest and scenic vista.
The granting of an oral license followed by substantial
reliance by the licensee was found to be an irrevocable
license in Hammond v. Mustard. 1s Where the license is one
of passage across property, as in this case, it is hard to see
what useful function is served by not calling this type of
estate an easement. The only possible objection, that an
easement is an estate in real property requiring compliance
with the statute of frauds, is not persuasive. If the equivalent of an easement requires statute of frauds compliance,
then this type of license should not be allowed under any
circumstances. This seems an appropriate case for an exception to the statute of frauds, because the reliance provides
sufficient evidence to avert fraud.
Waste
In Haskell v. Wood, 19 California adopted the unopened mine
rule for allocation of rights in minerals on the land between
the life tenant and remainderman. There is no waste where
the parties intended to permit the life tenant or tenant for
years to extract minerals from the property. The rule has
grown up that where a mine or oil well is open, the parties
intended to permit the person in possession of the land to
continue working it in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
On the other hand, where the mine was sealed, it is presumed
that the parties did not intend to permit the tenant to enjoy
the minerals. While the unopened mine rule is universal,20
17.
Rptr.
18.
Rptr.
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the converse
(that
an open mine may be completely exhausted
by a tenant), although unchallenged, makes no sense. It is
more reasonable, in searching for the intention of the parties,
to assume that where a mine is open, it will be worked in
accordance with the practice of the prior possessor of the
land. In the absence of other evidence, there is no basis for
assuming an intent of the parties to change the pattern of
development to the detriment of the landlord or remainderman.
The open mine rule arose when there was more concern
for speedy development and less for conservation of natural
resources. A more limited view of the tenant's right to remove
minerals from open mines should prevail today.

Real Property Securities
Harvey v. Davis l involves the Real Property Securities

Dealers' Ace and indicates that a very stringent interpretation
will be given to it. The act was passed to eliminate certain
abuses in the sale of real property securities which had previously been exempted from the aegis of the California Corporation Commissioner. A substantial market in real property securities had grown up with people buying without the
benefit of accurate financial information on the properties
involved. The provision construed in Harvey involved the
question of whether an individual was engaged in the business
of selling real property securities and thus obligated to register and provide financial information, subject to damages.
Plaintiff had advertised his property for sale in the newspaper.
Defendant contacted plaintiff and offered to purchase it for
$80,000 worth of approved second trust notes. When plaintiff
accepted, defendant contacted a person who wished to sell 32
second trust notes, of which 24 would equal $80,000 in value.
Defendant promised the seller that he would dispose of the
§ 20.6 (1952), Hardie v. Yuen, 258 Cal.
App.2d 301, 65 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1968)
is not to the contrary; it holds that a
mineral lease given by one cotenant
cannot be cancelled by the other. This
does not bear on the question of damages.

1. 69 Cal.2d 362, 71 Cal. Rptr. 129,
444 P.2d 705 (1968).
2. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 10237 et.
seq.
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the legislative history,
that a person who sells 24 notes is engaged in the business
of selling real property securities. An analogy was drawn
to the definition of a real estate broker who is described as a
person who sells three or more properties during the year. 3
Since 24 is more than three, the court held defendant to be
in the business. The other obstacle was to find that the
defendants were selling to the pUblic. Taking their lead from
federal securities cases, the court held that the public need
not include more than one person. The public is a class of
persons unable to protect themselves due to a lack of special
competence and knowledge in the field of real estate securities. 4
The stringency of this application is obvious. It would
appear that a person who sells 24 notes to a single individual
is no more in the business than a person who sells one larger
note to that individual. Furthermore, the analogy to real
estate brokers is somewhat inapposite. The essence of a real
property security is that it is readily transferable. Realty,
however, presents a more difficult subject for sale. Thus, a
person may spend full time selling property and only accomplish three or four sales a year; the same is not likely to be
true for real property securities. However, the interpretation
of the phrase "in the business" is in accord with the purpose
behind the statute-supplying appropriate information to unsophisticated investors.

Landlord and Tenant
Contributory Negligence of Landlord

The court showed a disposition to require due care of the
landlord in an unusual case this year. Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Titus5 was a suit by the landlord's insurer subrogated
to his claim against the tenant for negligence in using an
incinerator which did not conform to statutory requirements. 6
The tenant successfully defended on the ground that the land3. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 10131.1.
4. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346
U.S. 119, 97 L.Ed.2d 1494, 73 S.Ct.
981 (1953).
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6. Pub. Res. Code § 4446.
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incinerator that did not meet statutory standards and for failing to warn her of this deficiency. The court rejected the
plaintiff's argument that the landlord is under no duty to
warn tenants of obvious defects,7 taking the proper view that
this doctrine is applicable only to cases where the tenant sues
the landlord for damages.
The obvious defect exception is really a defense of contributory negligence, rather than one of determining the required
standard of care. Where both parties are negligent, neither
can recover. It can, however, be argued that in both cases
the question of negligence should be left to the jury to determine whether, under the circumstances, the landlord was
negligent in failing to warn the tenant of the defect. Obviously, the more patent the defect, the less likely failure to
warn will constitute negligence as a reasonable man might
presume that another person would note the defect.
Fixtures
Larkin v. Cowed was a suit by the owner of an apartment
building against the foreclosing beneficiary of a trust deed
to recover the value of draperies and carpets installed in the
apartment. The lower court found that since the parties
had intended to incorporate these items of personal property
into the realty, title to them passed with the realty. The court
of appeal affirmed, contrasting Dean Vincent, Inc. v. Redisko,
Inc.,9 which involved the installation of carpets in an apartment building, with Plough v. Peterson 10 in which carpets
were installed in a private home.
Hints in the opinion call for a rule of law that carpets
installed in apartments are generally intended to be part of
the property, whereas carpets installed in private homes are
not. This would be a misinterpretation, since the intention
7. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal.2d 443, 24
Cal. Rptr. 681, 374 P.2d 641 (1962).
8. 263 Cal. App.2d 27, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 290 (1968).

9. 232 Ore. 170, 373 P.2d 995
(1962).
10. 140 Cal. App.2d 595, 295 P.2d
549, 55 A.L.R.2d 1042 (1956).
CAL LAW 1969
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and drapes are necessary in most modern apartments in order
to rent them, and that they are installed with the purpose of
leaving them there for their useful lives, does not distinguish
apartment buildings from private homes. More and more
frequently, private homes are being sold with the carpets and
drapes intact. The prevalence of wall-to-wall carpeting and
custom-made drapes would indicate that in most cases, regardless of the "rental" nature of the property, these items are
intended to become part of the realty. The best way to view
these three cases is to note that in each case the decision
of the trial court was affirmed. Where the question is one
of intent the decision of the trial court will usually be determinative.
Constructive Eviction

If hard cases and small cases both make bad law, then the
law made by pro se cases is atrocious. A good example is
Conterno v. Brown.l1 Defendant tenant moved out before
the expiration of his lease and plaintiff landlord sued to recover the rent due until the landlord found a replacement
tenant.

That which the defendant could take no longer was the
noisy tenants who occupied the apartment just below his.
They were three in number, a twelve year old and her
parents, who joined in song at all hours, when not joined
in noisy quarrels that made sleep impossible. Defendant
complained to plaintiff, the common landlord, and he
expostulated with the offending tenant, to no avail. 12
The lease provided that lessor would not be liable for damage
arising from the acts or negligence of co-tenants, other occupants, or owners or occupants of adjacent property. The
court held that this clause prevented the tenant from claiming
constructive eviction, following the opinion in Bilicke v.
11. 263 Cal. App.2d 135, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 393 (1968).
488
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have been to hold the landlord free from suits for negligence
on the grounds of activities by others in the building. To hold
that this clause provides against constructive eviction by the
activities of others is to take a strong pro-landlord position.
Although the case does not indicate it, there were provisions
in the common lease enabling the landlord to control the
tenants. 14 If he failed to do so to the extent that one tenant
made the property uninhabitable by another, this constitutes
constructive eviction by the landlord. Although there are
many statements in California authorities that a person is not
constructively evicted by another tenant, they are all dicta. 15
The question had never been decided in this state. The
general rule is that constructive eviction occurs when it is
performed by someone deriving title from the landlord, including another tenant. 16
The grand-daddy of constructive eviction cases, Dyett v.
Pendleton,17 concerned the rental of adjoining units to persons
who used them for immoral purposes, and illustrates that
where the ousting activities are those of another tenant whom
the landlord could control but does not, the acts of the tenant
are considered the acts of the landlord. IS Thus, the exculpatory clause should have no application in Conterno, since the
tenant was claiming constructive eviction resulting from the
landlord's activity in failing to quiet the other tenants.
If the clause in Conterno was copied from Bilicke as the
13. 14 Cal. App. 342, 112 P. 201
(1910).
14. The lease forbade loud noise or
disturbances, piano playing after 6:00
p.m., and singing.
15. 30 Cal. Jur.2d 187, McDowell v.
Hyman, 117 Cal. 67, 48 P. 984 (1897)
(successful suit by a tenant against his
landlord for damages for eviction),
Sarina v. Pedrotti, 103 Cal. App. 203,
284 P. 472 (1930) (action for damages
against the landlord for the tenant's
eviction by trespassers), Lost Key Mines
v. Hamilton, 109 Cal. App.2d 569, 241
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P.2d 273 (1952) (eviction by trespassers
not constructive eviction where landlord
cooperated to oust trespassers).
16. 2 Powell, Real Property § 225[3]
(1967), 1 American Law of Prop. § 3.51 (1952).
17. 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. [1826]).
18. What makes this decision more
surprising is that another adequate
ground existed-a finding of no constructive eviction as a matter of fact,
since the landlord evicted the noisy
tenants, even releasing them from the
remaining terms of their leases.
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case and its unpersuasive opinion should have deterred the landlord from the use
of such ambiguous terms. In addition, the lease in Conterno
was a form imposed by the landlord and therefore subject
to all the infirmities of contracts of adhesion. The general
rule is to construe ambiguities in these contracts most strongly
against the party writing them. The court took no such
action here.
Dependency of Lease Clauses

In City of Stockton v. Stockton Plaza Corporation 19 the
court took another step toward establishing the mutual dependency of lease clauses. The city had leased land adjacent to
its urban renewal area to defendant, who agreed to construct
a convention center and motel. The lease permitted lessee
to terminate the lease after a year if he were unable to find
financing but had no provision for termination by the lessor.
The lessee was unable to find financing within a year and
the lessor terminated the lease. The court held applicable a
provision of the Civil Code which specified that a reasonable
time is allowed for performance where no time is specified in
the contract. 20
The court was swayed by the city's purpose in giving the
lease-revitalizing the area and providing Stockton with an
adequate convention center adjacent to the urban renewal
facilities. The court assumed, but did not support, the view
that the breach of lessee's covenant to build within a reasonable time would permit lessor to terminate the lease. In assuming that, the court implied that the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the covenant to build were mutually dependent.
There is a strong argument, however, that the covenant to
build was in fact a covenant to pay rent, which has always
been dependent on the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
19. 261 Cal. App.2d 639, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 266 (1968).
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of Property Occupiers

In the most important decision of the year, Rowland v.
Christian,l the supreme court restored sanity and coherence to
the tort liability of a possessor of land. The general rule for
tort liability holds a person responsible for injury to others
resulting from his lack of ordinary care or skill in managing
his property.2 Exceptions had, however, grown at common
law differentiating the duty of care owed to trespassers, licensees, and invitees. These distinctions created a multitude
of rules, definitions, and exceptions which often nonetheless
resulted in liability.3 In Rowland, the court purported to
extinguish those distinctions and to impose a duty to act
reasonably regardless of the status of the injured party.
Plaintiff was a social guest in defendant's apartment. -Defendant knew of a defect in one of the bathroom faucets, and
had asked her landlord to fix it. Defendant failed to warn
plaintiff of the defect when he used the bathroom, and the
fixture shattered, injuring plaintiff severely. The trial court
gave summary judgment to defendant. The supreme court
reversed and remanded for trial on the question of defendant's
negligence.
In attempting to limit the scope of the case, it will be noted
that, since Rowland involved a licensee, comments with respect
to trespassers are dicta. Moreover, this case would fall within
a recognized exception whereby the occupier of land is obligated to warn a licensee of a concealed danger. 4 It is clear,
however, that the court intended to clean the Augean stables
of this area, and to re-establish the usual rules of tort law. 5
Rowland may have broad implications in other areas. If it
1. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS,
in this volume.
2. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.
3. The means by which a harsh rule
is avoided can be viewed acronymically
as DEELS-Definitions, Exemptions,
Exceptions, Limitations, and Special
rules.

4. "This was the contention made by
appellants in the court of appeals and
the supreme court. Apparently only
one question by Justice Peters concerned the eventual grounds for decision. " (Letter from Jack K. Burman,
February 13, 1969.)
5. For a full discussion of Rowland
v. Christian see Moreau, TORTS, in this
volume.
CAL LAW 1969
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presage substantial changes in the rules relating to the right
of a tenant or his guest to recover from the landlord for
negligence in maintaining property. For example, where the
landlord is negligent in providing safe facilities and the tenant is negligent in failing to warn an injured party of defects
in the premises, the injured party may presently recover from
the tenant but not from the landlord. 6 If the liability of
owners and occupiers of property for their negligence is to be
harmonized with the remainder of tort law, the landlord in
such a case should also be liable to the injured party as a
joint tortfeasor, particularly since the landlord has a statutory duty to place and maintain residence property in livable
condition. 7
This provision redresses the lack of equal bargaining power
between landlord and tenant in residential leases and imposes
responsibility for repair on the party with the longer term
interest in the property and the one most likely to be financially able to make repairs.s Since the tenant is on the premises, the law also gives him the right to make repairs costing
less than one month's rent and charge it against the rent. 9
If Rowland is extended to the area of tenant-landlord suits
for injuries to the tenant, these statutory provisions will have
some effect in arguments relating to negligence, contributory
negligence, and assumption of risk. But the rather rigid rules
insulating the landlord from liability will be modified, and
more cases will be permitted to go to the jury.
6. Hanson v. Luft, 58 Cal.2d 443, 24
Cal. Rptr. 681, 374 P.2d 641 (1962),
Gustin v. Williams, 255 Cal. App.2d
Supp. 929, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1967).
This was not the case in Rowland, as
there was no allegation the landlord's
failure to repair constituted negligence
on his part.
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7. Cal. Civ. Code § 1941.
8. There may be cases where the
lessee of residential property has a
longer term interest or a deeper pocketbook than the lessor but these situations
have not been drawn to my attention.
9. Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.

CAL LAW 1969

28

